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ABSTRACT
Tax evasion, by its very nature, is difficult to observe. In this paper, we present a case study of
tax evasion in China.  The novel feature of our approach is that at a very disaggregated level of individual
products, we can measure evasion relatively precisely, by comparing the values that China reports as
imports from Hong Kong, with what Hong Kong reports as exports to China. We can match up this
‘evasion gap’ with the tariff (and VAT tax) schedule at the product level.  The result is striking: using the
data in 1998, we find that on average, a 1 percent increase in the tax rate results in a 3 percent increase
in evasion; these results hold using data from 1998.  The result is similar when a first-difference
specification is used with data in 1997 and 1998.  This relationship is nonlinear: the evasion elasticity is
larger at high tax levels.  Furthermore, the evasion gap is negatively correlated with the tax rates on
closely related products, suggesting that part of the evasion takes place by mis-reporting the type of
imports, in addition to under-reporting the value of imports.  This effect is even more pronounced when
the evasion gap is measured using quantities rather than values.
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  This paper studies the responsiveness of tax evasion to tax rates.  Much of the 
work in the theory and empirics of taxation has taken tax collection as given, and often 
costlessly executed.  This simplification is of course not realistic. Even within the United 
States, where tax collection is considered to be relatively efficient, about 17 percent of 
income taxes are estimated unpaid (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000).  A number of 
theoretical models have evolved to incorporate tax evasion, but these models fail to 
provide a clear prediction regarding the impact of tax rate on evasion.  In the pioneering 
model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the relationship between tax rates and evasion 
is ambiguous, and depends on the third derivative of the utility function.  A broader 
review of the literature reports that, more generally, theoretical predictions of the effect 
of tax rates on evasion are dependent on modeling assumptions (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 
2000).
1  Furthermore, even if we believe that increased tax rates will encourage greater 
evasion, there is still a need to assess the magnitude of this effect. Hence, empirically 
examining the effect of tax rates on evasion would be very useful from the perspectives 
of both theory and policy.  This has proven to be a challenging task due to the difficulties 
in measuring evasion, which by definition is not directly observed. 
A number of indirect approaches have been used to infer the behavior of tax 
evasion from measurable quantities such as currency demand or the discrepancies 
between national income and product accounts (e.g., Gutmann, 1977, Feige, 1979, Tanzi, 
1980).  These approaches have been criticized by Slemrod and Yitzhaki in their survey 
paper on the subject, since “[n]one of these approaches is likely to be reliable…as their 
accuracy depends either on unverifiable assumptions or on how well the demand for 
currency is estimated” (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000).  Furthermore, these approaches do 
not naturally generate an estimate of the responsiveness of evasion to tax rate.   
As a more direct approach to examining tax evasion, researchers have used data 
from the U.S. Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) conducted by the 
                                                 
1 Some models even yield strong predictions that run counter to the conventional wisdom that  higher tax 
rates increase evasion.  For example, the model of Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that if the punishment for  3
U.S. Internal Revenue Service.  Based on intensive audits of a random sample of tax 
returns, the data set gives information on reported taxable income and what auditors later 
conclude to be true taxable income.  Using these data, Clotfelter (1983) estimated that tax 
evasion is positively associated with tax rates, with the elasticity ranging from 0.5 to 3.  
Feinstein (1991), using a short panel of two years of TCMP data (1982 and 1985), found 
that increasing the marginal tax rate has a negative effect on evasion, contradicting 
Clotfelter’s conclusion. However, the main source of variation on tax rates in both of 
these studies comes from differential marginal tax rates across income levels, so it is not 
really possible to disentangle tax rate effects from income effects.   
In this paper, we take a new approach in measuring the effect of tax rate on tax 
evasion that is less likely to be contaminated by such problems.  Specifically, we examine 
evasion in China’s imports from Hong Kong, at a very disaggregated level (e.g., four-
door passenger car), by comparing Hong Kong reported exports and China reported 
imports of the same products.  In the absence of evasion (and measurement error), China 
and Hong Kong-reported numbers should be the same.  So far, the extent to which they 
differ has generally been taken to be simple measurement error (see, for example, 
Feenstra and Hanson, 2000).  However, when we match these data up with product-
specific tax rates in China (tariff plus value-added tax rates), we find that this 'evasion 
gap' is highly correlated with Chinese tax rates: much more value is 'lost' for products 
with higher tax rates.  Our methodology is related to that of Pritchett and Sethi (1994), 
who find that tax revenues divided by imports increase at a rate less than the official tax 
rate, in a sample of four developing countries.  Note, however, that our analyses are at a 
much higher level of disaggregation; furthermore, they are unable to disentangle illegal 
tax evasion from legal tax avoidance (e.g., taking advantage of tax loopholes and special 
exemption).  Tax avoidance, as it is legal, is more readily observed than evasion. 
Another novel feature of our study is that we are able to differentiate three 
different aspects of tax evasion: under-reporting of unit value, under-reporting of taxable 
quantities, and mis-labeling a higher-taxed product as a lower-taxed type.  We find strong 
evidence of mis-labeling, and limited evidence of under-reporting of unit value; on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
evasion is dependent on the value of taxes evaded (as is the case in China), tax rate increases will reduce 
evasion.    4
other hand, once shifting reported imports from a higher- to a lower-taxed category is 
controlled for, we do not find evidence of under-reporting of overall imported quantities.
2  
In looking at the effects of changes in tax rates between 1997 and 1998 on changes in 
evasion, we obtain similar results.  Finally, when we use a flexible functional form, we 
find that tax evasion occurs mostly at higher tax rates.  The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows: Section 2 describes the data on taxes and imports/exports.  Section 3 provides 
the details of our empirical specification and the results.  Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Data 
 
The trade flow data in this paper are taken from the World Bank's WITS (World 
Integrated Trade Solution) database, which in turn is derived from the United Nations' 
Comtrade database.  These data are collected by the United Nations Statistical Division 
from individual countries' trade records, and include information on imports and exports 
for each country, recorded according to the 6-digit Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding System (HS).  The United Nations allows individual countries to have a 
classification system more detailed than the HS 6 digit levels.  In the case of China, an 8-
digit classification (a refined version of HS 6-digit classification) is available.  However, 
we choose to use the import data at the 6-digit level in order to be compatible with Hong 
Kong-reported numbers.  The current HS classification system began in 1996, which is 
also the earliest year for which we have year-end data on tax rates.  
For every product that China imports from Hong Kong, we define Export_Value 
as that reported by Hong Kong, and Import_Value as that reported by China.  The 
original sample contained 5113 products in 1998 at the 6-digit classifications.  However, 
there were missing observations for 2820 classifications for either imports or exports.
3  
Of those remaining, a further 250 did not have consistent tax rates at the 6-digit level, and 
                                                 
2 Of course, outright smuggling that evades both Hong Kong and China’s customs is not captured in our 
data set. 
3 These were almost exclusively missing observations on exports; where observations were available for 
imports and not far exports, it is almost certainly the result of misclassified re-exports (see below).  When 
all regressions were repeated, using all observations on exports and redefining Gap_Value = 
log(1+Export_Value) – log(1+Import_Value), the sample size increased by about 2 percent, and our results 
were virtually identical to those reported in Section 3 below.  5
were also omitted, leaving a final sample of 2043.   Some regressions involve fewer 
observations due to missing observations on other regressors. 
Because of Hong Kong's proximity to China and its special status as a former 
colony, it also does a considerable amount of indirect trade on behalf of other economies 
(including Taiwan).
4  Hong Kong reports (in the Comtrade database) separate data on 
indirect as well as direct exports destined for China.  China, on the other hand, only 
reports what it considers to be direct imports from Hong Kong.  Indirect imports (say 
from the U.S. via Hong Kong) are aggregated, in principle, with direct imports from the 
source country and reported as part of the imports from that source country.  Thus, in 
theory, China-reported imports from Hong Kong should match up to Hong Kong-
reported direct exports to China.  However, the data suggests that China cannot always 
successfully separate indirect imports from direct imports.  One likely source of 
confusion is Taiwan’s indirect exports to China via Hong Kong.  As the government of 
Taiwan does not allow its firms to have direct trade with China, Taiwan’s exports to 
China often label Hong Kong as the destination.  Sometimes shipping labels are modified 
while the goods are en route to Hong Kong or in a warehouse in Hong Kong.  At other 
times, an intermediary in Hong Kong is used to record the transaction as an import by 
Hong Kong from Taiwan plus an export from Hong Kong to China. While the Hong 
Kong customs may understand this as an indirect export to China, China might 
misclassify at least a portion of such transactions as being direct imports from Hong 
Kong.
 5  It is important to note that, as the tariff and VAT rates are the same for a given 
product whether it is a direct or indirect import from Hong Kong, there is no tax 
advantage to mis-reporting between direct and indirect imports.  We will return to this 
issue later. 
                                                 
4 Hong Kong's reliance on re-export trade has created the false impression that manufacturing activity is 
virtually nonexistent in Hong Kong itself.  To counter this misconception, we refer to a recent study by the 
Chinese commercial law firm Johnson, Stokes, and Master (JSM), which described Hong Kong's 
manufactured exports as including, "a wide range of products including clothing, electronics, watches & 
clocks, jewelry, textiles and chemicals."  Their complete report on Hong Kong may be downloaded from: 
http://www.hg.org/guide-hongkong.html.  Note that if we do limit our sample to the industry categories 
implied by (JSM), the implied effect of the tax rate on evasion increases somewhat, and the fit of the 
regressions improves marginally. 
 
5 We thank Professor SUNG Yung-Wing at the Chinese University in Hong Kong for a helpful discussion 
on this issue.  6
Comtrade contains data on both the value and quantity of imports/exports; we will 
utilize both sets of data.  In the case of quantities, we are also required to know the units 
of measurement (e.g., weight, number; area); in most cases, these values match up 
between the Chinese (import) and Hong Kong (export) data.  Where they do not, it is 
primarily because China reports the weight of imports, while Hong Kong reports the 
number of units.  These observations are not included in the quantity regressions. We 
define Export_Qty to be the total quantity of exports from Hong Kong destined for China 
as reported by Hong Kong and Import_Qty to be the total quantity of imports (reported 
by Chinese customs) from Hong Kong into China. 
Our basic definition of the evasion gap is given by: 
 
 Gap_Value = log(Export_Value) – log(Import_Value) 
 
Thus defined, a larger gap is an indication of greater evasion.  We similarly define the 
gap in quantities reported as: 
 
Gap_Qty = log(Export_Qty) – log(Import_Qty) 
 
The data on Chinese tariffs and taxes were also taken from WITS, derived from 
the UNCTAD TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) database, which gives 
tariff rates at the 8-digit HS level.  Since our import/export data are at the 6-digit level, 
we need some way of aggregating up to that level.  Fortunately, there is relatively little 
variation in tax rates at the 6-digit level, so we are able to restrict ourselves to the sample 
for which there are uniform rates at this level of aggregation.
6  In addition to tariffs, there 
is a value-added tax levied on most imports, which varies from 13 to 17 percent.  Our 
measure of taxation, Tax1998, is the sum of these. 
The earliest year for which we have data on tariffs is 1996, and our data reflect 
year-end tariff rates.  Unfortunately, due to constantly shifting tariff rates in China 
                                                 
6 We may also utilize the full sample, by using the simple mean or median tariff rate for each 6-digit 
industry.  However, since we do not know the composition of imports, this may had considerable noise to 
our tariff rate measurement.  When we include products for which there is tariff variation at the 6-digit  7
throughout the years 1992-97, the appropriate tax rate to be utilized is unclear for this 
period (Lardy, 2000).    In our benchmark regressions, we therefore report results 
utilizing data from 1998, the most recent year for which data were available on both 
imports and exports.   As an extension, we also implement estimation using two years of 
data (1997 and 1998).  We will explain the construction of the 1997 tax rate later in the 
paper. 
Part of evasion may take place by mislabeling imported products from a higher-
taxed to a lower-taxed type. It is reasonable to assume that this type of mis-labeling is 
easier for “similar” products.   Operationally, two products are considered “similar” if 
they are in the same 4-digit category.  We define Avg(Tax_o) to be the average level of 
Tax for all other products in a good’s 4-digit class, weighted by Export_Value.  For a full 
list of variables, definitions, and sources, see the Appendix. 
Summary statistics for our variables are contained in Table 1A.  One point to note 
is that the so-called evasion gap actually has a negative mean.  This appears to be due to 
Chinese customs misattributing part of the indirect imports as direct imports.  In fact, 
when we exclude observations for which the ratio of direct to indirect exports (based on 
Hong Kong’s reporting) is very low, the evasion gap quickly rises above zero (see Table 
1B). We will further discuss the complications that this may create later.  Also note that 
the evasion gap is higher when measured in values rather than quantities; this is 
suggestive that some evasion takes the form of under-reporting of per unit values. 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
 
Benchmark specification 
We begin by defining the following:  Exportk  = Hong Kong reported direct 
exports of good k to China (which we take as the true import of good k by China from 
Hong Kong).  Importk = Direct imports of good k by China from HK as reported to the 
Chinese Customs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
level, all results are weakened slightly (generally by a few percent), consistent with our measurement error 
interpretation.  8
  The prediction that we will be examining in the empirical test is that the 
difference between exports and imports is increasing in the tax rate, due to evasion.  That 
is: 
 
(1)  log(Exportk ) - log(Importk )= α + β Taxk + εk      
 
Tax-induced evasion implies that β>0. Unfortunately, because China cannot 
always accurately separate indirect imports (e.g., U.S. exports to China passing through 
Hong Kong) from genuine direct imports from Hong Kong, we do not observe Importk 
directly.
7 Instead, China’s recorded imports from Hong Kong, Import*k, contains part of 
indirect imports misclassified as direct imports.  In other words, we actually observe the 
following: 
 
(2) Import*k = Importk + Misclassified Indirect Importk . 
 
  It is crucial to note that the same tax rate is applicable to both direct and indirect 
imports.  Therefore, the magnitude of the misclassified indirect imports for a particular 
product, say k, should be uncorrelated with the tax rate for that product (since there is no 
tax advantage from misclassification).  Rather, it is plausibly proportional to the 
magnitude of the import of that product (subject to some random error).  We will assume 
that 
  
(3)   Misclassified Indirect Importk = k ηk Importk  
 
Where k is a constant, ηk is an independent and identical random variable, and 
distributional assumptions to be made later.  Thus, 
 
                                                 
7 There are two types of indirect exports passing through  Hong Kong to China.  The first one, 
"transshipments," goes straight from ships docked at Hong Kong to trucks destined for China.  The second 
involves a stopover in Hong Kong before being sent to China.  The latter is likely where China gets 
confused about the true exporter. 
  9
(4)   Import*k   = Importk + Misclassified Indirect Importk 
   =  (1+  k ηk ) Importk 
 
  Combining these four equations, we obtain  
 




          Gap_Valuek= α* + β Taxk + ek 
 
where α* is a (new) constant, and ek a composite error term that is assumed to be iid and 
normal with a mean of zero and a constant variance.  To be more precise, if we denote the 
mean of  εk – log(1+ k ηk ) by α0, then, 
 








Equation (5) will be the benchmark for our regression specifications.  The results 
are reported in Table 2.  In the first column, we have the basic estimate of the sensitivity 
of evasion to tax rates, which is 2.82.  That is, if the tax rate increases by one percentage 
point, the gap between reported exports and imports increases by three percent.  When 
observations with the highest and lowest one- percent of values of Gap_Value are 
excluded, the coefficient is virtually unchanged, as seen in the second column.  In order 
to make direct comparisons with other results reported in this paper, we also repeated this 
basic specification, using the sample of industries with observations on Avg(Tax_o), and 
also limiting the sample to industries with observations on quantities.  Changing the 
sample in this way once again had very little impact on the reported coefficient.  10
   Unfortunately, because of the noise introduced by misclassified indirect imports, 
the fit of the regressions might be considered to be fairly poor.  A common method of 
dealing with noisy data is aggregation.  We follow this approach, using as the outcome 
variable the mean value of Gap_Value for each tax rate.  There are 44 different tax rates, 
thereby yielding a total of 44 observations.  Results for the regression weighted by 
number of observations per tax rate, as well as the unweighted regression, are listed in 
Table 3, columns 1 and 2.  The coefficient on Tax, 3.10, is similar to the baseline 
regressions from Table 2, and is significant at the one percent level.  Moreover, the R2 
increases to 0.26.  The unweighted regression yields virtually identical results.  Taking 
means is a linear operation, which allows for the same interpretation of these coefficients 
as in Table 2.   
As an alternative way to reduce the noise in the data, we also use the median gap 
in reported imports, Gap_Value, for each tax rate as the outcome variable.  This approach 
has the advantage of further limiting the effect of outliers in the data (though the 
interpretation of the coefficient on Tax is not as straightforward); the results, reported in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, are the same as those obtained from the mean regressions.  
Again, while the point estimate on the tax rate is approximately 3, the goodness-of-fit as 
measured by the adjusted R-squared has increased to 0.3.  
  So far, we have concentrated our discussion on the statistical properties of the 
estimation.  It may be useful at this point to also consider the economic implication of the 
point estimation in terms of revenue collection.  From (1), we can infer how the 
percentage-reported imports may be affected by an increase in the tax rate: 
 
(11)  (dImports/dTax) = (dExports/dTax) - β 
          Imports          Exports 
 
So, the effect of a tax increase could reduce reported imports through two 
channels: by reducing the true imports (i.e., Hong Kong’s exports, the first term in (11)); 
and by reducing the fraction of true imports that is reported to the Chinese customs (-β, 
the second term in equation (11)).  While we do not have a direct estimate of the first 
term in Equation (11), it is reasonable to assume that it is negative.  Therefore, an  11
estimate of β equal to 3 percent implies that, for any products whose tax rates exceeding 
33.3 percent, a one-percentage point increase would lead to more than one-percentage 
point reduction in reported imports.  The average tax rate on imports (tariff plus VAT) in 
China is 36.1 percent (see Table 1).  Therefore, one may infer that the average tax rate is 
already on the wrong side of the Laffer curve: at the average rate, any increase in the tax 
rate would actually produce a reduction in tax revenue. 
 
Evasion by mis-labeling 
In addition to underreporting of the value of imports, evasion can also take the 
form of mis-labeling -- a higher-taxed good is reported as a lower-taxed variety.  To 
investigate the existence of this type of evasion, we add the average tax rate of similar 
goods as a regressor.  For a particular good k, its “similar products” are defined as all 
other products in the same 4-digit category.
 8  Define Avg(tax_o) to be the average tax 
rate for product k’s similar products, weighted by the value of their Hong Kong-reported 
exports.  We implement a regression of the following form:  
 
(8)   Gap_Valuek = α + β1*Taxk + β2*Avg(Tax_o) + υk  
 
If there is a significant component of mis-labeling of goods, we expect β2 < 0.   In 
other words, holding a product's own tax rate constant, the lower the tax rate on product 
k’s similar varieties, the greater the incentive to mis-report the import of k as other 
similar products.   
Table 4 reports results with Avg(Tax_o) included as a regressor.  Consistent with 
the mis-labeling interpretation, we find that the coefficient on Avg(Tax_o) is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent level, taking on values between -2.3 and -4.6.  Furthermore, 
the inclusion of the average tax rate of similar goods as a regressor results in a substantial 
increase in the coefficient on Tax, which takes on values of 4.9 to 7.7.   
                                                 
8 We cannot look at the 5-digit level, because we have only a single observation in each 5-digit class for 
about 75 percent of the sample.  We obtain very similar results to those reported in the main text if 
aggregation is at the 3-digit level. 
9 One additional control that we might include is the proportion of imports into China that are exempt from 
tariffs, because they are to be re-exported.  This could potentially be correlated with tax rates, since there 
would be less incentive to lobby for exemptions if tax rates are low.  Unfortunately, we have exemption  12
 
Quantity versus unit value 
So far, we have not separated under-reporting unit values versus under-reporting 
quantities; both will show up as a positive coefficient on Tax.  We now turn to 
regressions that use the gap in imported quantity as the dependent variable.  Specifically, 
we examine the following regression:  
 
(9)   Gap_Qtyk = α + β1*Taxk +  υk 
 
(10)   Gap_Qtyk = α + β1*Taxk + β2*Avg(Tax_o) +  υk 
 
If under-reporting of quantities is prevalent, we expect to also find a positive 
coefficient on Taxi in the quantity regression (10), β1 > 0.  If there is mis-labeling of the 
imports from a higher-taxed category to a lower-taxed one, we expect to find β1 > 0 and 
β2 < 0.  
Results paralleling those of Table 2 and 4, using Gap_Qty as the dependent 
variable, are listed in Table 5.  Interestingly, when Avg(Tax_o) is excluded from the 
regression, the coefficient on Tax is insignificantly different from zero.  However, when 
Avg(Tax_o) is included, we find that the coefficient on Tax becomes significant, positive, 
and approximately equal to the coefficient on Avg(Tax_o) in absolute value.  Thus, the 
data suggests the following: under-reporting total value of imports and mis-labeling type 
of goods are widespread, while the total quantities imported across all tax brackets are 
not significantly under-reported. 
 
Tariff exemptions 
Large proportions of Hong Kong’s imports into China are exempt from import 
tariffs.  These exemptions presumably impact incentives for evasion, and could 
potentially be correlated with tariff rates, since high tax rates may increase incentives for 
                                                                                                                                                 
rate data for only about half of the sample, and only at the 2-digit HS level.  When we do include this 
coarse proxy as a regressor, it is of the 'correct' sign (i.e., greater exemption implies less evasion), but not at 
all significant.  Moreover, the coefficient on Tax increases by about 80 percent relative to the figures 
reported in Table 2, though this change is entirely due to the difference in sample.  13
exemption seeking.
10 More precisely, for products where exemptions are common, 
evasion may be less sensitive to tax rates than for products where exemptions are rare, 
since exemptions provide a legal means of avoiding tax payments.  
We now describe how the fraction of imports that is exempted from tax is 
calculated for each of the 6-digit product.  First, we obtained data at the 8-digit level on 
the exemption status of imports from the Chinese Customs Statistics 1998.  These data 
also included the  value of China-reported imports from Hong Kong at the  8-digit level, 
which were used to calculate  a weighted average of the proportion of  imports  exempt 




















where Exempt is an indicator variable denoting  whether a product is exempt from  
import tariffs, HS6  denotes  products at the 6-digit level of aggregation, and HS8 denotes 
products at the 8-digit level of aggregation.  Aggregating in this way is necessary in order 
to match the Hong Kong-reported export data. 
Table 6 shows the results of the following regression: 
 
(11)   Gap_Valuek = α + β1*Taxk + β2*Exemptionk + β3* Taxk*Exemptionk  
β4*Avg(Tax_o) + β5*Avg(Tax_o)*Exemptionk + υk  
 
Consistent with higher exemption rates lowering the incentives for evasion, the 
coefficient on Exemption is consistently negative and significant (See columns (1) to (4)).  
When interacted with Tax, the coefficient is negative, highly significant, and 
approximately the same size as the coefficient on Tax.  This implies that, for a product 
with complete exemption in 1998 (i.e., Exemption=1), there is no effect on evasion from 
tax increases.  By contrast, for industries with no exemptions, the implied elasticity is 
                                                 
10 In fact, there is very low correlation between Tax and Exemption.  14
about 26 percent.
11  In looking at the effect of exemptions on incentives to relabel goods, 
we find that the coefficient on Avg(Tax_o)*Exemption is positive, though not significant 
at conventional levels (t-statistic of 1.4), implying less relabeling for goods with high 
exemption levels.  In columns (5) to (8), we report the results of the same regressions, 
using Gap_Qty as the outcome variable, and obtain qualitatively very similar results. 
 
First differences in tax rates 
Our primary results suggest a strong effect of taxes on evasion, acting through 
both under-pricing and product mis-labeling to lower-taxed categories.  There may be 
concerns, however, that certain features of the different products that are not directly 
measured and not included in the regressions may have driven the results.  We do not 
have specific factors in mind that may bias our result.  However, to be on the safe side, 
we now use two years of data and adopt a first-difference specification that can net out all 
such time-invariant and product-specific determinants of the tax evasion.  More precisely, 
we estimate the following: 
 
(12)  DGap_Valuek = α + β1*DTaxk + β2*DAvg(Tax_o) + υk  
 
where a prefix D- denotes the change between 1997 and 1998.   
To determine the tax rate for 1997 turns out to be a little challenging.  While there 
was virtually no change in the tariff structure during 1998, there was a fairly large-scale 
tariff reform on October 1, 1997.  Since our import data for 1997 was cumulated for the 
year, we have to use the weighted average of tax rates that prevailed before and after the 
tariff reform.  However, the knowledge of a tariff reform in the near future could affect 
the timing of the imports.  We do not have a good way to correct for this.  Instead, we 
assume that the effective tax rate for 1997 is given by: 
 
                                                 
11 This figure seems unreasonably large; if we omit outliers of Gap_Value, the implied elasticity of evasion 
with respect to taxes drops to 16 percent, while the significance of all coefficients in this regression are 
more or less unchanged.  Also, there may be concerns that, because most of the exemption ratios are 
relatively high (the 25
th percentile of Exemption is 0.68), making inferences about the effects of evasion at 
Exemption = 0 is too far out of sample.  However, when we run regressions comparable to those reported in  15
Tax1997 = 0.75*(Year-end tax rate for 1996) + 0.25*(Year-end tax rate for 1997) 
 
  We then define DTax = Tax1998 – Tax1997. We will similarly denote changes in 
other variables using the D-  prefix.  
Table 7 shows the estimation results.  We note that the R-squared values are very 
low in these regressions; this is not surprising, as we have differenced out much of the 
information in the data.  In columns (1) and (2), with the change in Gap_Value as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on DTax is significant, though marginally smaller than 
that obtained in our level regressions.  The coefficient on Davg(Tax_o) is no longer 
significant at conventional levels (t-statistic of approximately one), but is of the same 
sign as in the level regressions.  We obtain similar results with the change in Gap_Value 
as the dependent variable (see columns (3) and (4)). 
 
Flexible functional form 
We now allow the marginal effect of a tax increase on evasion to differ across 
different tax rates.  Following, for example, Chamberlain (1997), we allow for the slope 
to differ across quartiles, with knots at tax rates of 29, 34, and 42 percent.  The results, in 
Table 8, suggest that there is relatively little effect on evasion at relatively low tax rates.  
However, as tax rates rise above the median level of 34 percent, the extent of evasion 
rises dramatically.  The marginal effect then tapers off again at higher levels.  As before, 
the effect of tax rate increases is larger, when we control for average tax levels by 4-digit 
HS. 
  This pattern of non-linearity is consistent with the existence of a fixed cost in 
undertaking evasion activity.  For example, if there is some fixity in the punishment for 
evasion, there may be a threshold tax level above which evasion becomes worthwhile.
12  
Alternatively, it is also consistent with a probability of detection that is relatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
Table 6, limiting the sample to observations with Exemption < 0.5, we obtain a coefficient on Tax of 22.  
This suggests that functional form is not driving our results on the interaction of Tax and Exemption. 
12 Unfortunately, the punishment code for customs evasion in China is sufficiently vague as to give 
relatively little guidance on this question.  While the punishment includes the confiscation of the goods 
involved, it also may incorporate a fine of an unspecified amount.  Furthermore, in recent years, some 
traders have been executed for tariff evasion, thereby highlighting the full extent of autonomy that the 
authorities have in determining punishments.  16
invariant to the tax rate, so that the benefit of evasion increases more rapidly than the cost 
as tax rates increase. 
 
Robustness to Alternative Specifications of Indirect exports 
As noted in the data section of this paper, the Chinese customs-reported import 
figures are likely to include part of the indirect imports that are mis-classified as direct 
imports.  We have argued that the amount of such mis-classified imports should not be 
correlated with the tax rate on the product since the same tax rate is applied to both direct 
and indirect imports.  We can make a more direct assessment of this assumption by 
restricting our sample to those products that Hong Kong does relatively few indirect 
exports to China.   
We repeated the basic regressions from Tables 2 and 3, excluding observations 
with relatively low values of Direct Export Ratio = (Direct Export)/(Indirect Export + 
Direct Export).  We use cut-off values of 0.01,0.05, and 0.1;the results using export 
values are reported in Table 9.  In the case of the simple binary regression, the coefficient 
on Tax increases slightly with the cut-off.  The qualitative inference, however, remains 
the same.  The results with Avg(Tax_o) included as a regressor are somewhat mixed, 
possibly owing to the colinearity of Tax and Avg(Tax_o) once the sample size has been 
reduced.  When we look at the results from the quantity regressions, the coefficients are 
uniformly suggestive of a stronger effect of tax rates on evasion, when products with 





In this paper, we take a new approach in measuring the effect of tax rates on tax 
evasion, by looking at the reporting gap between China and Hong Kong on China’s 
imports from Hong Kong, as a function of the Chinese tax rates (tariff plus VAT rates).  
We find that this 'evasion gap' is highly correlated with tax rates: much more value is 
'lost' for products with higher tax rates.  The point estimates suggest that the Chinese  17
average tax rate on its imports is already on the wrong side of the Laffer curve: any 
increase in tax rate is likely to produce a reduction rather than an increase in tax revenue. 
By comparing the evasion gap in quantities and in values, we conclude that there 
are widespread practices of under-reporting the unit values of the imports, and mis-
labeling higher-taxed products as lower-taxed varieties. 
 As a broader contribution to the literature, we believe that our approach can be 
applied to other countries as well.  In addition to providing more information on the 
behavior response of tax evasion to tax rates, the generalized multiple-country study 
could provide a more objective measure of the laxity of rule of law across countries – in 
contrast to the subjective perception based measures of corruption and rule of law now 
popular in empirical studies.  We leave this, and other extensions, for future work. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 An alternative approach, since we are estimating a very reduced form of the evasion equation, is to 
simply include the value of indirect exports as a regressor.  The results from this approach are virtually 
identical to those previously reported.  18
 
Table 1A – Summary Statistics, Full Sample 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min. Max Obs. 
       
 
log(Value_Export) 4.68  2.81 -6.21  12.72 2043
 
log(Value_Import) 5.29  2.53 -5.52  12.20 2043
 
Gap_Value -0.62  2.43 -13.79  9.64 2043
 
log(Qty_Export) 5.98  4.49 -2.30  20.17 1478
 
log(Qty_Import) 6.14  4.05 -2.30  21.99 1972
 
Gap_Qty -1.06  2.56 -13.35  11.74 1368
 
Tax Rate (Tariff+VAT)  
(at the 6-digit level)  36.09  10.34 13  134.6 2043
 
Avg(Tax_o) (at the 4-digit level)  36.09  9.20 13  88 1760
 
Exemption 0.78  0.31 0  1 1918
 
Direct Export Ratio  0.17  0.23 0.00  0.99 2024
 
Change in Tax Rate, 1997 – 1998  -5.56  5.98 -30  9 1808
  19
Table 1B – Summary Statistics, Restricted to Products  
with Direct Export Ratio above the Median 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min. Max Obs. 
       
 
log(Value_Export) 5.95  2.42 -4.51  12.72 1031
 
log(Value_Import) 5.55  2.62 -5.12  12.20 1031
 
Gap_Value 0.40  1.96 -7.92  9.64 1031
 
log(Qty_Export) 8.03  4.52 -2.30  20.17 725
 
log(Qty_Import) 6.93  4.40 -2.30  21.99 984
 
Gap_Qty -0.13  2.31 -8.63  11.74 656
 
Tax Rate (Tariff+VAT)  
(at the 6-digit level)  37.00  10.23 13.00  104.20 1031
 
Exemption ratio  0.82  0.28 0  1 969
 
Avg(Tax_o) (at the 4-digit level)  37.01  9.18 13.00  88.00 919
 
Change in Tax Rate, 1997 – 1998  -6.23  6.07 -30  9 957
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,
 
V
o
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.
 
2
2
,
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o
.
 
5
 
(
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
-
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
,
 
1
9
7
9
)
,
 
p
p
.
 
5
-
1
3
.
 
 
F
e
i
n
s
t
e
i
n
,
 
J
o
n
a
t
h
a
n
.
 
"
A
n
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
T
a
r
i
f
f
 
E
v
a
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
i
t
s
 
D
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
"
 
R
A
N
D
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
 
o
f
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
,
 
V
o
l
.
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2
,
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o
.
 
1
 
(
S
p
r
i
n
g
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1
9
9
1
)
,
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p
.
 
1
4
-
3
5
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u
t
m
a
n
n
,
 
P
e
t
e
r
 
M
.
 
"
T
h
e
 
S
u
b
t
e
r
r
a
n
e
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n
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
.
"
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
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s
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
,
 
V
o
l
.
 
3
3
,
 
N
o
.
 
6
 
(
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
-
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
,
 
1
9
7
7
)
,
 
p
p
.
 
2
6
-
3
4
.
 
 
S
l
e
m
r
o
d
,
 
J
o
e
l
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n
d
 
S
h
l
o
m
o
 
Y
i
t
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h
a
k
i
.
 
"
 
T
a
x
 
A
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
,
 
E
v
a
s
i
o
n
,
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n
d
 
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
.
"
 
N
B
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R
 
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
P
a
p
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r
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o
.
 
W
7
4
7
3
,
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
0
.
 
 
T
a
n
z
i
,
 
V
i
t
o
.
 
"
T
h
e
 
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
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n
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
:
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
  
3
2
I
m
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
"
 
B
a
n
c
o
 
N
a
z
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o
n
a
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e
 
d
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l
 
L
a
v
o
r
o
 
Q
u
a
r
t
e
r
l
y
 
R
e
v
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w
,
 
N
o
.
 
1
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5
 
(
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e
c
e
m
b
e
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1
9
8
0
)
,
 
p
p
.
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-
5
3
.
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o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
,
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
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r
a
d
e
 
S
o
l
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t
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(
W
I
T
S
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2
0
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.
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t
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h
a
k
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,
 
S
h
l
o
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"
A
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o
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n
 
‘
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
T
a
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E
v
a
s
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:
 
A
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h
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r
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i
c
a
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n
a
l
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.
 
J
o
u
r
n
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f
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u
b
l
i
c
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,
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,
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.
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(
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1
9
7
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,
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.
 
2
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2
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3
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A
:
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r
i
a
b
l
e
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e
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n
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
 
I
m
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r
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_
V
a
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u
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:
 
V
a
l
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e
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f
 
i
m
p
o
r
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s
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o
m
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o
n
g
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o
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g
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n
t
o
 
C
h
i
n
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,
 
a
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r
e
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r
t
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d
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t
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h
i
n
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c
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,
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1
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6
-
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i
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.
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l
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u
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(
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h
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i
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.
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u
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b
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c
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.
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c
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u
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c
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i
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i
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c
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.
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u
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u
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i
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f
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c
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.
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f
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b
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c
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r
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c
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r
i
g
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n
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i
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o
t
a
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a
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i
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o
m
i
n
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n
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t
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i
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i
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q
u
a
l
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t
h
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u
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r
i
f
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a
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1
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i
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p
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p
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